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Chapter 29




This chapter is about the extreme outer limits of law’s Empire, the borderlands where 
the rule of law ends, and the primal need to defend the political order begins. In other 
words, it is concerned with the legal and ethical issues connected with the repression 
of serious threats from within to the Roman political order, specifically sedition, con-
spiracies, riots and provincial revolts. On occasions, of course, the repression of such 
threats took place entirely outside law’s realm. The real or perceived gravity of the situ-
ation would unleash the state’s capacity for overwhelming violence, and order would 
be restored by massacres, mass enslavements and beatings— apparently without serious 
challenges to the legal (or ethical) propriety of the response. But on other occasions, law 
was very relevant. Judicial institutions and legal categories were employed to legitimate 
repressive action; conversely, legal rights and conventions were invoked to limit and 
critique such crackdowns.
Two concerns therefore run through this chapter. The first is to reconstruct the legal 
underpinnings of repressive responses to fundamental threats to the political order, in-
sofar as such underpinnings existed. This involves consideration of substantive rules 
of criminal law, of judicial processes and of coercive powers inherent in certain offices. 
A second concern is to outline the various types of limitations on state power that were 
routinely invoked in relation to acts of repression. Some of these limitations were em-
bedded in positive law, for instance the right of appeal (provocatio) and citizen immu-
nity from torture. Others were more the product of custom and practice, such as the 
expectations of a public trial and of a clearly formulated charge. It is also important to 
notice various ethical discourses that were used to try to restrain the full force of the 
law, discourses including those of clementia (“mercy”), crudelitas (“cruelty”) and saevi-
tia (“harshness”). Such discourses were instances of wider Roman society— especially 
aristocratic society— attempting to influence the uses to which legal powers and pro-
cesses were put.
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29.2 Sedition in the Republic
During the Republic, the senate and magistrates faced three fundamental problems in 
dealing with sedition in the city of Rome. The first related to manpower:  there was no 
standing army, and in any case the exercise of military command was prohibited within 
the pomerium.1 A second problem emerged from the rights of provocatio and tribunician 
intercession. Certainly from 300 bc, and perhaps earlier, citizens in civilian life had a legal 
right to appeal to the people against a magistrate’s decision to execute or scourge them 
using his powers of summary discipline (coercitio)— at least in political cases.2 There was 
also a separate but possibly related right, namely the ius auxilii: the right of the tribune of 
the plebs to intervene and protect a citizen from harsh treatment by a magistrate. Thirdly, 
whilst the iudicium populi and (in the late Republic) the quaestiones de vi and maiestatis 
provided judicial fora in which charges of rioting and sedition could be brought, they were 
not always sufficiently expeditious to deal with serious threats, and could be coerced or 
entirely shut down by a hostile crowd.
At least according to the Romans’ own traditions about their early history, an initial 
response to such problems was to use the office of dictator. Dictators were reportedly 
appointed to deal with sedition on occasion during the early Republic.3 If these reports 
are true, the dictatorship was probably attractive for this purpose because the office was 
immune from provocatio (Liv. 2.29, 4.13, 8.33– 35; Festus 198M). There were also the facts 
that dictators had no colleagues to interfere with their work, and that they were apparently 
immune from tribunician auxilium (Liv. 2.18.8; Plut. Fabius Maximus 9, with Drogula 
2007, 446). But there are no reports of the dictatorship being used to deal with domes-
tic unrest in the third century bc or later. The lex Valeria of 300 bc is reported to have 
removed dictators’ immunity from provocatio;4 if this is correct, then the utility of the 
dictatorship for repressing sedition would have henceforth been limited.
The legal issues involved with repressing sedition came to the fore again thanks to 
the activities of Ti. Gracchus and his supporters in 133– 132 bc. The initial crackdown on 
Gracchus was little more than a lynching, with only some very vague appeals to legal prin-
ciple. But then an inquiry involving the consuls of 132 and a consilium was established fol-
lowing a decree of the senate— although the legality of this was very questionable too.5 The 
lex Sempronia of 123, passed by Tiberius’ brother Gaius, put this question beyond doubt by 
requiring a vote of the people before a capital sentence could be pronounced.6 Henceforth, 
1 Drogula 2007, 435– 442 with earlier literature.
2 On the leges de provocatione and the historicity of those reported for the early Republic, see von 
Ungern- Sternberg 1970, 31, n. 32; Lintott 1972; Bauman 1973b. On coercitio, see Drogula 2007, 428– 430 
with further literature.
3 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.70.2– 3; Liv. 4.13– 16; 6.11– 17; Inscr. Ital. 13.1 (368 BC).
4 Festus 198 M; cf. Bauman 1973b.
5 Cic. Amic. 37; Val. Max. 4.7.1; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 20. See von Ungern- Sternberg 1970, 38– 43 and 
Lintott 1999b, 162– 3 on its legality (or lack thereof).
6 Cic. Rab. perd. 12; cf. Plut. C. Gracch. 4, with discussion by von Ungern- Sternberg 1970, 
48– 54. The law did not prevent courts set up by a vote of the people from pronouncing capital 
sentences: Lintott 1999a, 163.
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quaestiones extraordinariae of the sort used in 132 (and also in the Bacchanalian affair of 
186 bc) were not legally possible.7
In 121 bc, therefore, the senate devised a new solution to deal with what it perceived 
to be another emergency situation created by C.  Gracchus and his supporters:  the so- 
called senatus consultum ultimum (SCU).8 The senate decreed “that L. Opimius the consul 
should see to it that the res publica suffer no harm”.9 Relying on this decree, Opimius 
availed himself of a military force and led a lethal crackdown on Gracchus and his sup-
porters in which several thousand people allegedly died (Plut. C. Gracch. 16– 17). This same 
decree was used in a variety of other emergency situations to authorise action against 
those who found themselves on the wrong side of the majority of senators (Golden 2013, 
104– 149 for references).
Whilst various modern scholars have made quite categorical statements about the le-
gality of the SCU,10 the better view is that its legality was arguable, but that not every-
one accepted the arguments. Several separate (quasi- )legal justifications are visible in the 
sources. First, the very wording of the decree shows that it was presented as a measure to 
avert harm to the Republic. When L. Opimius was prosecuted (and acquitted) in 120 bc 
for repressing the Gracchans, the defence was that ignoring the lex Sempronia had been 
legally justified by considerations of public safety (Cic. D e o r. 2 .106, 2 .132, 2 .134, 2 .165). 
One can perhaps see in this argument a version of a principle that is expressed in Cicero’s 
De legibus: “Let the safety of the people be the highest law” (3.8: salus populi suprema lex 
esto). Secondly, Sallust refers to the SCU as conferring power on magistrates “in accord-
ance with Roman custom” (more Romano). Since custom was viewed as the bedrock of 
constitutional propriety (cf. Pina Polo, ch. 7), Sallust may be reflecting an argument that, 
by the late Republic, the decree had been employed often enough and for long enough to 
legitimate it.11
Whatever arguments were made in support of the legality of the SCU, it is evident 
that not everyone accepted them. Opimius’ prosecutors in 120 bc obviously did not. 
Furthermore, in 63 bc an elderly senator, C. Rabirius, was tried for perduellio (“treason”) 
for his role in the repression of Saturninus in 100 bc. Both the surviving version of Cicero’s 
speech in defence of Rabirius and also Cassius Dio’s account of the incident treat it as a 
partisan attempt to impugn the legality of the SCU, an impression that is accepted by most 
modern scholars.12
Aside from the SCU, several mechanisms were used during the late Republic to deal with 
political emergencies. The tumultus declaration was repurposed for such ends. Originally, 
7 von Ungern- Sternberg 1970, 53– 54. Bacchanalian affair and aftermath: Liv. 39.8– 19; FIRA 1.30; cf. 
von Ungern- Sternberg 1970, 29– 38; Lintott 1999b, 161– 162.
8 The decree is called this by Caes. B Civ. 1.5 and Liv. 3.4 (anachronistic), although the title was 
not a technical term in Antiquity.
9 Cic. Cat. 1.4: uti L. Opimius consul videret ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet, cf. Cic. 
Phil. 8.14.
10 e.g. Golden 2013, 148.
11 Sall. Cat. 29; cf. Cic. Mil. 70. Note too Drogula 2007, esp. 447– 451.
12 Cic. Rab. perd.; Dio Cass. 37.26– 28; Suet. Iul. 12; cf. Lintott 1999b, 168– 169; von Ungern- 
Sternberg 1970, 83– 85.
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this declaration was made in response to a pressing threat from a foreign enemy. It empow-
ered the responsible magistrates to raise an army quickly, and to ignore the usual exemp-
tions from military service that some citizens enjoyed on the grounds of age, occupation 
or priestly service.13 In the late Republic, this decree came to be used on occasion to raise 
armies to deal with incidents of armed sedition.14
A final kind of emergency decree was the so- called hostis declaration.15 This was used 
first in 88, when C. Marius and eleven of his supporters were declared enemies (hostes) in 
a senatorial decree and a statute passed by an assembly.16 As the death throes of the 
Republic continued, the senate passed hostis decrees during other crises,17 although there 
is no evi-dence of other occasions on which matching statutes were passed. 18
The purported legal effect of the hostis decree was to declare that the targets had, at some 
point in the past, become hostes and thus had already forfeited their Roman citizenship. 
This meant that they had lost their right of provocatio and could be killed without offend-
ing the lex Sempronia: arguably no capital sentence on citizens had been pronounced, but 
rather the loss of citizens’ civil rights was being declared (Bauman 1973a, 279– 282). Unlike 
the SCU, the hostis decree expressly named the individuals at which it was directed; it also 
allowed them to be killed by anyone with impunity after the initial emergency had abated 
(Bauman 1973a, 277). The targets of the decree had almost always fled Rome by the time 
it was passed, thus putting them— as a practical matter— outside the reach of the magis-
trates and the courts in Rome.19
As with the SCU, the hostis declaration was controversial. We hear from Valerius 
Maximus that in 88 bc the aged augur Q. Mucius Scaevola refused in the senate to vote 
Marius a hostis; to judge from the fact that Sulla surrounded the curia with troops, 
Scaevola was not the only senator with misgivings (Bauman 1973a, 273). In response to 
the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63 bc, Cicero attempted to extend the legal analysis implicit 
in the hostis declaration and argue that the ringleaders of the conspiracy who had been 
apprehended in Rome (and against whom no hostis declaration had been passed) by their 
very actions were enemies of the state, and therefore had lost their citizenship automati-
cally.20 We learn, however, that several senators of a popularis persuasion stayed away from 
the sitting of the senate in which these conspirators were sentenced to death “lest they vote 
on a capital matter concerning a citizen” (Cic. Cat. 4.10). Moreover, after the execution of 
the conspirators, Cicero was immediately attacked by two tribunes for executing citizens 
without trial (Cic. Fam. 5.2.8; Cass. Dio 37.42.1), and this charge was implicit in the legisla-
tion that Clodius used to secure Cicero’s exile in 58 bc (Vell. Pat. 2.45.1; Dio Cass. 38.14.4; 
Livy, Per. 103).
13 Golden 2013, 44– 45.
14 For references and discussion, see Lintott 1999b, 153– 155; Golden 2013, 42– 103, 189– 199.
15 Fundamental on this decree is Bauman 1973a. See too von Ungern- Sternberg 1970, 111– 122; 
Lintott 1999b, 155– 156.
16 Livy, Per. 77; Vell. Pat. 2.19; cf. App. B Civ. 1.60– 61; Cic. Brut. 45.168; Val. Max. 3.8.5.
17 For references, see Lintott 1999b, 155– 156.
18 Although note D.4.5.5.1, and the discussion of Bauman 1973a, 283– 285, 291– 292.
19 Lintott 1999b, 156; cf. Bauman 1973a, 278. 20 Cic. Cat. 4.10; cf. Cic. Sest. 39.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon May 09 2016, NEWGEN
9780198728689_Ando241015OUK_.indb   377 5/12/2016   2:05:55 PM
378   The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society
29.3 Conspiracies against the Emperor
The coming of the Principate brought with it a new kind of fundamental threat to the political 
order in the form of conspiracies to assassinate the emperor and to usurp the purple. When 
such plots were discovered (or allegedly discovered) before anything had happened to the 
emperor, the praetorian guard could now in theory and (mostly) in practice be used to appre-
hend conspirators who were in the immediate vicinity of the emperor himself. In these cases, 
there was therefore no need to legitimate the creation of an informal posse by passing the 
SCU. The hostis declaration was, however, still used in the Principate on a few occasions when 
it was not possible to apprehend immediately a rebel or an emperor who had been toppled.21
Once conspirators were in custody, the charges they faced were obvious enough: conspir-
ing to kill a magistrate or a holder of imperium or potestas fell within the definition of maies-
tas (D.48.4.1.1). Moreover, from the time of Augustus onwards, acts (and sometimes words) 
that diminished the majesty of the emperor and his family were interpreted as amounting 
to treason as well (see Williamson, ch. 26). There are some reports from the early Principate 
of conspirators being tried by jury courts (e.g. Suet. Tib. 8.1; Dio Cass. 54.3.5– 6) or before an 
emperor exercising his judicial powers (e.g. Tac. Ann. 15.58). Once the senate was fully es-
tablished as a court, conspirators were sometimes tried before it (e.g. Inscr. Ital. 13.1, p. 205, 
cf. SHA Ant. Pius 7.4). Certain emperors attempted to make a virtue of the fact that they left 
such trials to the senate (e.g. SHA Hadr. 7).
The process o f repressing a lleged c onspiracies against t he e mperor prompted heated 
debate. While some authors admit that the punishment of people who plotted against the 
emperor was at times warranted,22 it is frequently claimed that emperors punished alleged 
conspirators out of paranoia and with inadequate evidence of guilt,23 or that they did so 
for ulterior motives or having been duped by devious informers or courtiers.24 Moreover, 
there were often concerns that the emperor and his supporters had transgressed certain 
expectations about proper legal process. The concerns centred less on the denial of provo-
catio, which would not have helped conspirators much, since ultimate appeal was now to 
the emperor— the very target of the conspiracy and, quite often, the leader of the repres-
sion.25 There were, however, other, more relevant rights. In the wake of some conspira- 
cies, Roman citizens— even high- status ones— were tortured, in spite of the traditional 
prohibition on torturing free people; such cases are generally reported with shock by our 
sources for the Principate.26 Some emperors are criticised for executing putative conspir-
ators without charge or proper trial.27 On other occasions, the complaint was that the 
21 e.g. Suet. Tib. 54; Calig. 7 (Nero Julius Caesar and Drusus Julius Caesar, 29 and 30 AD); Suet. 
Ner. 49; Dio Cass. 63.27.2b (Nero, 68 AD); SHA Marc. 24.9, Avid.Cass. 7.6 (Avidius Cassius, 175 AD); 
Dio Cass.  74(73).8.5 (Falco, 193 AD). See too D.4.5.5.1.
22 Amm. Marc. 19.12.17; Dio Cass. 55.18.1.
23 e.g. Amm. Marc. 29.1.18; Tac. Ann. 15.73; cf. Dio Cass. 55.19; Sen. Clem. 1.20.
24 Ulterior motives: Dio Cass. 55.18.5, 59.21.4, 69.2.5; SHA Hadr. 4.3; Tac. Ann. 15.73. Courtiers and 
informers: Dio Cass. 55.18.6, 61(60).29.4– 6a; Tac. Ann. 2.27– 28, 11.1– 3, 16.18; Suet. Claud. 37.
25 Appeal under the Empire: Santalucia 1998, 219– 221, 270, 275– 276; Garnsey 1966.
26 e.g. Dio Cass. 57.19.2, 60.15.6; Sen. Ira 3.18, cf. Dio Cass. 59.25.5b. See too Garnsey 1970, 141– 147, 213– 216.
27 e.g. Iuv. 10.69– 72; Tac. Ann. 15.69, 16.18; cf. Dio Cass. 55.19.2.
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accused was condemned in a secret hearing, which offended the convention that trials 
should be held in public.28
As the Imperial period progressed and the emperors’ autocracy became more abso-
lute, legal limitations (both formal and conventional) on the process of repressing con-
spiracies were eroded. The expectation of publicity in trials faded around the turn of the 
second century ad.29 Moreover, by the early fourth century, citizens were no longer legally 
immune from torture in treason cases.30 Ammianus Marcellinus, writing in the second 
half of the century, assumes that it is entirely reasonable to torture people of all statuses if 
a conspiracy against the emperor is being investigated.31
Not all the restraints advocated by the elite on the emperor’s handling of conspiracies re-
lated to process: some fell more into the category of internal, ethical limitations. Repressive 
actions against political conspiracies that were regarded as in some sense excessive or too 
widely directed are condemned as examples of crudelitas and saevitia.32 On the other hand, 
clementia towards conspirators is loudly praised. In the De clementia, Seneca recommends 
that the young Nero should show mercy to conspirators and other wrongdoers partly for 
utilitarian reasons, claiming that it will increase the popularity of the princeps, and hence 
his ultimate security. He also argues that extenuating circumstances often reduce conspira-
tors’ culpability and that some are capable of reform (Sen. Clem. 2.7). In the third century, 
this issue was still sufficiently important to prompt Cassius Dio to use a tradition about 
Augustus’ mild response to a particular conspiracy as an opportunity to invent a lengthy 
dialogue between Augustus and Livia in which the latter successfully advocates the benefits 
of clementia (Dio Cass. 55.14– 22; cf. Sen. Clem. 1.9– 10). Later still, Ammianus Marcellinus 
also forcefully expressed the view that it is preferable for an emperor to find reasons for 
pardoning conspirators, not opportunities for punishing them (Amm. Marc. 19.12.17).33
29.4 Riots in the Imperial Period
During the Principate, the authorities in the city of Rome had far greater resources to 
cope with rioting than their Republican counterparts, since there were now permanent 
military forces in the form of the praetorian guard and urban cohort. There were also 
permanent military forces available to put down riots in several of the other large cities of 
the Empire.34 If the need arose, soldiers were dispatched to smaller cities in which order 
28 e.g. Tac. Ann. 11.2; cf. Tac. Ann. 13.4. For publicity and criminal trials, see generally Crook 1955, 
106; Lintott 1972, 253– 254.
29 Santalucia 1998, 218– 219.
30 D.48.18.10.1; cf. CTh.9.5.1pr = C.9.8.3 (a. 314); CTh.9.35.1 = C.9.8.4 (a. 369); Sent.Paul.5.29.2; cf. 
Garnsey 1970, 141– 147, 213– 216.
31 Amm. Marc. 19.12.17, with Garnsey 1970, 143. 32 e.g. Sen. Ira 3.18– 19; Suet. Tib. 61.
33 For other statements about clemency for conspirators, see Dio Cass. 59.26.4; SHA Marc. 24– 25; 
Avid. Cass. 7– 14; Tac. Ann. 2.31.
34 For a classic discussion of urban unrest, see MacMullen 1966, 163– 191. Sünskes Thompson 
provides a list of disturbances, including riots, in the Severan period (1990, 21– 44), with analysis   
(1990, 95– 166). Aldrete 2013 provides a recent treatment of riots in Rome, with bibliography.   
Kelly 2007 discusses source problems and the process of repressing riots.
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had broken down.35 In the later Empire, the standing military presences in Rome and the 
new capital of Constantinople were somewhat limited, which made riot repression more 
difficult, although troops could still be brought in (Nippel 1995, 98– 100).
When troops were unleashed, this could result in the beating and killing of rioters 
(sometimes a few, sometimes a large number) until the disturbance stopped.36 On other 
occasions, the arrest of at least some rioters is mentioned.37 This was done with a view to 
punishing them, either summarily or after a trial. There are also a few clear references to 
people being tried for participation in a riot.38
The juristic sources make clear the legal underpinnings of the prosecution of rioters before 
courts. Rioting was an offence under both the lex Iulia de vi and the lex Iulia maiestatis, so 
rioters in Rome could be prosecuted before the courts established by these statutes.39 A charge 
could also be brought before a magistrate or governor exercising cognitio using the offence 
categories of these statutes. By the Severan age, there was also a legal regime in place relating 
to the repression of urban youth violence: according to Callistratus, governors should initially 
deal with the turbulent behaviour of those commonly called the iuvenes (“the youths”) with 
admonishments and beatings; recidivists, however, must be exiled or even punished capitally, 
especially if they too often behaved seditiously and riotously (seditiose et turbulente).40
From various juristic sources we learn that the rights of people convicted of rioting were 
somewhat abridged. According to the Sententiae Pauli, the penalties that governors and 
other officials faced for ignoring a citizen’s attempt to appeal to the emperor did not apply 
if the convicted person had been imprisoned for committing a crime against public order 
(disciplina publica) (Sent.Paul.5.26.1– 2). In usual criminal cases, the governor could refuse 
to allow the accused to appeal to the emperor, but was required to write to the emperor to 
confirm this decision before the punishment could be carried out. But by a pronounce-
ment of Marcus Aurelius, this requirement was waived in cases of sedition and bloody 
factional strife (factio cruenta) to avert an imminent threat (D.28.3.6.9; cf. D.49.1.16pr).
When it came to the more direct repression of rioters by troops, a detailed legal 
justification would in many cases have been unnecessary. The governor had a general 
duty to maintain the peace in his province (D.1.18.13pr). Prior to 212 ad, riots in pro-
vincial cities would have mostly involved peregrines who did not enjoy the right to 
appeal to the emperor, and would have been repressed by governors with imperium 
who could punish crimes quite summarily and with few restraints.41 Of course, rioting 
35 e.g. Suet. Tib. 37; Tac. Ann. 13.48.
36 e.g. Tac. Ann. 14.61; Sen. Oct. 846– 850 (Rome, 62 AD); Joseph. BJ 2.494– 498 (Alexandria, c.66– 
68 AD); Hdn. 1.12.6– 9 and Dio Cass. 73(72).13.4– 5 (Rome, 190 AD); Euseb. Hist. eccl. 8.14.3 (Rome, 
311 AD). In other cases, it is clear that soldiers were at least used to cow the crowd into 
submission: Tac. Ann. 12.43 (Rome, 51 AD); Tac. Ann. 14.45 (Rome, 62 AD).
37 e.g. Vett. Val. 5.6.120– 121 [ed. Pingree].
38 CPJ 158 a & b, 435; Joseph. AJ 20.118– 136; Joseph. BJ 2.232– 246; P.Oxy. XXII 2339; Tac. Ann. 14.17; 
Vett. Val. 5.6.120-121 [ed. Pingree]; cf. IEph. 2.215 = IMagn. 114; Cic. Verr. 2.1.73– 85.
39 D.48.4.1.1; D.48.6.3pr– 48.6.3.3; D.48.6.5pr; D.48.6.10pr.
40 D.48.19.28.3; cf. Rodriguez 2012 on the relevance of this legal regime to Caracalla’s massacre of the 
Alexandrians in 216 AD.
41 On the governor’s imperium, see Richardson ch. 9. In practice, governors often opted to try 
peregrines for crimes using procedures that were quite similar to those used with Roman citizens. 
Furthermore, there is the complication that the magistrates of some cities might have retained some 
level of local criminal jurisdiction; see Roselaar ch. 10.
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crowds in Rome or Italy would have contained many Roman citizens; so too with any 
rioting crowd elsewhere in the Empire after 212. In these instances, killings carried 
out by troops who had been commanded directly by the emperor would be unprob-
lematic. In other cases, one imagines that soldiers could claim that they had beaten or 
killed rioters in self- defence. But the fact that rioters in the Imperial period (unlike 
some during the late Republic) were mostly lower class probably meant that nobody 
enquired into these questions too closely. Our surviving sources are certainly rather 
uninterested in them.
This lack of interest in legal niceties does not mean, however, that our Imperial authors 
thought that there should be no restraints on the actions of emperors, magistrates and 
governors faced with riotous situations. But the restraints that they urged were more of an 
internal, ethical nature.42 There was often a feeling that authority figures (and especially 
emperors) should avoid responding to riots punitively, and instead show mercy. Libanius 
enunciates this in relation to a riot in Antioch in 387 ad: rioters are demented, and the ap-
propriate way to treat the insane is with medicine, not punishment; it is incumbent on the 
emperor to show clemency towards them (Lib. Or. 19.8– 24).
This is not to say that the violent and punitive repression of riots was ruled out alto-
gether: this was sometimes thought to be a sad necessity. In some reports of riots, however, 
authority figures of whom the author basically approves are presented as trying other meth-
ods of defusing the situation first before finally resorting to military force. When military 
repression was used, there was often (albeit not invariably) a feeling that only tyrannical 
emperors would repress non- violent crowds for verbal unruliness at the chariot races, glad-
iatorial games or other spectacles. Thus, for example, disapproving accounts survive about 
Caligula’s summary execution of members of a crowd who protested verbally in the Circus 
Maximus against his tax regime (Joseph. AJ 19.24– 26; cf. Dio Cass. 59.28.11). As Josephus 
notes in his account, the people of Rome generally expected emperors to respond positively 
to shouted petitions at spectacles. The general aversion to responding with massacres to 
verbal protests and requests is encapsulated in Libanius’ anecdote about how Constantine 
I judged it as “appropriate to a ruler” (βασιλικός) to tolerate verbal unruliness from a crowd 
(Lib. Or. 19.19).
29.5 Provincial Revolts
If the ancient sources show minimal interest in the legalities of riot repression, this 
observation applies a fortiori to provincial revolts.43 Presumably, those guilty of rebel-
ling against Roman rule in a province could have been brought before the relevant 
42 For a fuller treatment of the arguments in this and the following paragraph, see Kelly 2007, 
160– 167 with further references.
43 On the causes of provincial revolts, see Dyson 1971 and 1974, now to be read with Woolf 2011. 
Pekáry 1987 and Sünskes Thompson 1990, 21– 44, 176– 190 provide catalogues of revolts and some 
analysis. Gambash (2009, 2012 and 2013) focuses on the Roman responses to the revolt of Boudica 
and the Jewish revolt of 66– 73/ 4 AD. MacMullen 1966, 192– 241 discusses provincial revolts, inter 
alia.
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provincial governor and (at least from the late Republic) charged with maeistas or 
vis. Reports of such judicial responses to provincial revolts are, however, exceedingly 
rare.44
The reasons for this rarity are not difficult to fathom. Provincial revolts were gener-
ally serious military emergencies, and as such provoked the sort of large- scale retributive 
measures that the Romans often visited on defeated foreign enemies. Thus, once the rebels 
were worsted in pitched battle, a number of unpleasant fates could await them and their 
people. Μen of fighting age, and sometimes whole communities, were massacred.45 In the 
case of other revolts against Roman rule, mass enslavements are reported, as is the destruc-
tion of rebel settlements and crops.46 There is scant sign in the surviving sources of any 
legal qualms concerning the massacre or enslavement of populations, or the incineration 
of crops and settlements. The reasons are doubtless similar to those suggested in relation 
to riots: before 212 ad the vast majority of rebels were peregrines and hence subject to 
unlimited gubernatorial coercitio; and even in the late Empire, most rebels were of low 
socio- economic status.
This is not to say that more subtle and constructive responses to the problem of revolts 
by subject people were impossible, either in the wake of revolts, or even in anticipa-
tion of them. In some cases, populations who had revolted or had tendencies in this 
direction were disarmed by the Roman authorities.47 When revolts did break out and 
were repressed, hostages were sometimes then taken to ensure future good behaviour.48 
Some lucky rebels were given land on which to start a new, more prosperous, and— in 
theory— less disruptive life.49 The same perceived connection between landscape and 
rebelliousness is also visible in M. Vipsanius Agrippa’s policy of relocating populations 
from the mountains to the plains following the Cantabrian revolt of 19 bc— although 
not before he massacred the men of military age and disarmed everyone else (Dio Cass. 
54.11.5). It has also recently been suggested that in the aftermath of the Boudican revolt, 
the initial slaughter gave way to a rather nuanced Roman policy of mollifying local re-
sentment, designed to prevent another flare- up in Britain.50 Since oppressive behaviour 
by Roman provincial administrators was often seen as a factor in provoking revolts, the 
quaestio repetundarum (cf. Richardson, ch. 9) was regarded by some as restraining riots 
and rebellions, since it gave outraged provincials a non- violent means of redress (Cic. 
Verr. 2.1.82).
These more nuanced responses to the problem of provincial revolts were no doubt partly 
the result of pragmatism, but ideology probably had a role. There are traces in the sources 
of ethical reservations about the harsh treatment of rebellious populations: such treatment 
was, after all, not especially congruent with the claim that the Romans ruled their Empire 
44 The few examples of such reports include App. Hisp. 38, Caes. B Gall. 6.44, Joseph. BJ 2.77 (cf. AJ 
17.298), and Tac. Hist. 4.13.
45 e.g. App. Hisp. 68; Tac. Ann. 14.37.
46 e.g. Enslavements, App. Hisp. 68, 98; Dio Cass. 54.31.3, 54.34.7; Liv. 34.21. Destruction of 
settlements and crops, App. Hisp. 71, 87, 98; Flor. 1.33.9; Liv. 34.9.
47 Chrest. Wilck. 13 (with Philo In Flacc. 92– 93; cf. 86– 91, 94); Dio Cass. 54.31.3; 60.21.4; Tac. 
Ann. 12.31.
48 e.g. App. Hisp. 38, 41. 49 App. Hisp. 43– 44, 75; Livy Per. 55.
50 Gambash 2012; cf. Gambash 2013, 182– 183.
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for the benefit of their subjects. Occasionally, one even sees such a beneficent ideology at 
work in cases in which defeated rebels were afforded clementia.51
More often, though, ancient authors were forced to grapple with the ideologically in-
convenient truth that rebellions were repressed with merciless brutality. One response 
to this awkward reality was to emphasise the rebels’ bad faith and trickery toward their 
Roman overlords and allege that they had committed lurid atrocities during the revolt.52 
Sometimes, too, provincial revolts (and also slave rebellions) were assimilated with latro-
cinium (“banditry”) (Grünewald 2004, 33– 71), an activity whose perpetrators by definition 
forfeited many conventional protections afforded by morality and law. Another discursive 
strategy was to treat the provincial rebels not as pacified peregrini but rather as foreign 
hostes. This is perhaps most clearly seen with the Jewish revolt of 66– 73/ 4 ad, in the wake 
of which a triumphal procession was held in Rome and coins were struck with the legend 
“Judaea captured” (Judaea capta)— responses usually reserved for victories over foreign 
enemies.53 One can see a similar tendency in narratives of other revolts. Rebels are rou-
tinely called hostes and the authors’ labelling of particular uprisings slides between the 
language of rebellion (e.g. rebello, ἀφίστημι) and that of war (bellum/ πόλεμος).54 In some 
narratives of military action, standard ethnographic stereotypes attached to particular 
barbarian groups are stressed to emphasise the otherness of the rebels— and hence their 
exclusion from the Romans’ moral realm.55
29.6 Conclusion
The threats to the Roman political order with which this chapter has been concerned were 
quite diverse, as were the Roman authorities’ repressive responses to them. But a number 
of connecting themes have emerged. One is the ongoing tension during all periods of 
Roman civilisation between, on the one hand, ideas about the appropriate legal and ethi-
cal limitations on the exercise of state violence against the individual, and, on the other 
hand, the perceived need to deal with fundamental political threats efficiently. Another 
theme relates to status: the sources, perhaps unsurprisingly, show a great deal more con-
cern about the propriety of repressive acts against high- status individuals— both in the 
sense of those enjoying higher civic status, and also in the more general sense of those with 
higher socio- economic status. Furthermore, status was in some senses malleable, since 
there were attempts to declare— either legally or discursively— the seditious or the rebel-
lious to be hostes, thereby excising them from the citizen body or the peregrine population 
of the Empire. A final point relates to the impact of autocracy. While both legal and ethical 
discourses about the limits of state repression exist in all periods of Roman history, the 
51 Caes. B Gall. 7.41; Suet. Tib. 20 (cf. Dio Cass. 56.16; Vell. Pat. 2.114); Tac. Ann.1.57.
52 Bad faith and trickery: Liv. 28.24, 28.32; Polyb. 11.29, 11.31, 3.40, 3.67; Vell. Pat. 2.118– 119; Tac. 
Ann. 1.58. Atrocities: App. Hisp. 96; Dio Cass. 62.7; Tac. Ann. 14.33; Val. Max. 7.6 ext. 2.
53 Gambash 2013, 183– 187.
54 e.g. Dio Cass. 56.18– 25, 62.2, cf. 62.9; Suet. Tib. 16; Tac. Ann. 1.57; cf. Tac. Ann. 2.88, 14.29– 39; 
Tac. Agr. 14– 16; Vell. Pat. 2.110– 112, 2.118– 119.
55 e.g. Dio Cass. 62.11; Liv. 35.5.
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increasingly autocratic system of the later Empire prompted a stronger focus on the ruler’s 
ethical response to various threats, especially on his exercise of clementia and avoidance 
of crudelitas. This preoccupation was very different from the fierce emphasis on citizens’ 
rights in the late Republic.
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